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Abstract
Statistical tests with large sample sizes can have large power. Power is the
ability to detect an effect. Detection is indicated by a result which is statisti-
cally significant. A test with large power will detect a very small effect. This
very small effect may not be meaningful in the context of the analysis being
conducted. The courts have the perception that for an effect to be mean-
ingful it is necessary for the effect to be statistically significant. However,
statistical significance is not a sufficient condition for an effect to be mean-
ingful. This can lead to a difficulty where testimony of no meaningful effect
is interpreted by counsel as one of no statistically significant effect. Should
the difference between a meaningful effect and a statistically significant effect
be explained in reports and if so, how? Some possible answers are proposed.
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Statistical tests with large sample sizes can have large power. Power is the
ability to detect an effect. Detection is indicated by a result which is sta-
tistically significant. A test with large power will detect a very small effect.
This very small effect may not be meaningful in the context of the analy-
sis being conducted. The analysis may be fortunate enough to have a large
dataset available, with a correspondingly large number of degrees of freedom.
Any statistical test conducted using such a dataset has correspondingly high
power. Very small differences in mean quantities in a comparison of responses
to different treatment groups can be statistically significant but would not
be judged meaningful by scientists.
Often with problems of inference the question of statistical significance is
of no interest. A statistical analysis is conducted to understand the random
process that generates the data and the possible sources of variation. This
will then help the decision-maker.
However, in court statistical significance can be of interest. The court is
interested in differences in responses of some variable to different treatments.
There is a general understanding in the courts that for a difference to be
meaningful it has to be significant in a statistical sense. Some courts will
understand enough to be interested in the level of significance, recognising
that the lower the level, the greater the difference in the responses to the
different treatments.
If the data set available for analysis is very large then there are a large
number of degrees of freedom and associated tests will have a large power.
As a consequence, a very small significance probability can be associated
with a very small difference in response. The very small difference may not
be meaningful in that the difference in response, whilst being very small, is
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sufficiently small that there is no discernible difference in response. The court
notices, or is told, that the difference is statistically significant. The court
then thinks the difference is meaningful and makes a judgement accordingly.
The expert is then in a quandary. They have to explain to the court
that the difference is not meaningful. Such an explanation may lead more to
confusion than to enlightenment. An example is given in Section 1.2. Section
1.3 suggests solutions to the quandary.
1.2 A case study design and analysis
The problem of interpretation associated with a test with large power is
discussed in the context of the variation by location in England of quantities
of cocaine on banknotes. This variation is studied with use of a large dataset,
with a large number of degrees of freedom, of banknotes in general circulation
in England and Wales. Any statistical test conducted has correspondingly
high power. Very small differences in mean quantities amongst locations can
be statistically significant but would not be judged meaningful by scientists.
Evidence evaluation with the likelihood ratio requires a background dataset
from a relevant population in order that an appropriate statistical model may
be chosen, with choices of parameters if necessary. Often the choice of the
relevant population is uncontroversial. However, in cases that involve the
discovery of cocaine on banknotes this is not the case. Background data
for banknotes are the quantities of cocaine on banknotes in general circula-
tion. The controversy concerns the choices that are made of the locations
from which the banknotes are sampled. The current database in use by the
company that analyses banknotes for drugs contains many banknotes taken
from banks around Bristol. An alternative suggestion is that the background
database be case-specific. For each case, a sample of banknotes is taken close
in location to the place where the crime was committed, and close to the en-
vironment in which the crime was committed. Thus, for a crime committed
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in a night club in a particular town notes from general circulation should be
taken from night clubs in that town. The use of the current database assumes
that there is no variation in the quantity of cocaine across the country. A test
of this assumption (Aitken et al., 2017) had very high power. The difficulty
this caused for interpretation is discussed below.
The choice of which banknotes to sample in order to have a representative
sample of banknotes in general circulation is by no means straightforward.
The notes used in the MSA database were accepted by Appeal Court rulings
in 2002 and 2004: Compton and Compton[2002] EWCA Crim 2835 and Benn
and Benn [2004] EWCA Crim 2100. However, this choice of notes for a
sample of a population relevant as background to crimes elsewhere in the
UK was questioned in a judgement in England in 2015 (R. v. Rashid and
others, [T20147216], 19 January 2015). The court was very critical of the
composition of the database currently used. Remarks included: ‘[i]t is a
database of pure convenience’ and ‘[t]he assertion that notes from banks are
typical is not supported by any evidence and is illogical’.
Some consideration of the meaning of the word relevance is pertinent. A
letter in the Journal of Forensic Sciences in 2017 gave the following definition
of relevance which is particularly appropriate in the context of sampling
banknotes from general circulation:
The relevant population . . . is arguably those who had access to
the crime scene or who inhabited the geographic area where the
crime was committed. Moretti and Budowle (2017)
In the context of sampling banknotes in general circulation as part of an
investigation into a drugs-related crime, this definition could be edited to
read:
The relevant population (of banknotes in general circulation) is
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arguably those that were in the geographic area where the crime
was committed when the crime was committed.
The phrase ‘access to the crime scene’ has been melded into the phrase
’geographic area’ and a temporal aspect has been included. The definition
that the background database be case-specific is unrealistic. The crime may
not be investigated until some considerable time after it was committed or
the crime may relate to a long period of time. In both cases, notes would
have moved in and out of the area through natural circulation. Similarly
notes in the environment of the crime, such as a night club, will also have
left the environment through deposit at a bank or with other customers.
The current database has many notes taken from banks around the Bristol
area. In order to counter criticism that this procedure was unrepresentative of
notes in general circulation, research was undertaken to consider the variation
in quantities of cocaine on banknotes in general circulation across the country.
It is important to know if the variation was sufficiently great that the
location and environment of the crime under investigation should be of rele-
vance when sampling from the population of banknotes in general circulation.
A study (Aitken et al., 2017) was conducted and the results showed that the
variation was not sufficiently great and the comment in Rashid could be
rebutted. However, the analysis also provided an interesting problem con-
cerning a distinction between meaningful and statistical significance.
Banknotes were obtained from eight redistribution centres chosen to rep-
resent a source of banknotes with a good geographical spread across England
and Wales in terms of area in which they last circulated, following a sugges-
tion by experts at the Bank of England. There are no redistribution centres
in Wales and notes from Wales are sent to centres in England. In total, 1950
notes were analysed, each twice. Thus there were 3900 observations and a
correspondingly large number of degrees of freedom for the analysis.
A mixed effects model gave statistically significant differences in responses
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amongst the eight locations at a very low level. There were two reasons for
this. First, there is auto-correlation in the measurements which can cause
estimates of standard deviations of regression coefficients to be too small and
hence lead to a reduction in the p-values of significance tests. Second, there
were a large number of degrees of freedom so the power of the test was very
high. However, inspection by expert analytical chemists determined that the
differences were not meaningful in the sense that their conclusions would not
differ for notes analysed from different locations. Some scientists use a verbal
scale to interpret a numerical likelihood ratio (e.g. ENFSI, 2015). In such a
paradigm, a meaningful difference may then be thought to be one that leads
to a change in the verbal description of the support for the likelihood ratio.
1.3 Discussion
The conclusion of the analysis was that the differences in mean responses
for each of the eight locations were not meaningful. Thus the following
situation can arise. The statistician as expert witness testifies that there is
no meaningful support for a difference in responses for the locations. Counsel
then asks for confirmation that the results are not statistically significant.
However, they are statistically significant. The statistician cannot deny this.
However, the statistician has testified that there is no meaningful support.
It could be argued that the statistician has strayed outside their area of
expertise in their testimony.
There is a difference between meaningful support and statistical signifi-
cance and it is one of interpretation. The difference is difficult for a statistical
layman to understand. The difficulty cannot be resolved as an evaluation of
evidence through the use of a likelihood ratio. It would not be helpful, for
example, to summarise a result of no meaningful support with the statement
that the evidence provides . . . support for the proposition of no geographical
variation versus the proposition of geographical variation. Fact-finders and
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counsel will almost certainly have difficulty in understanding that statistical
significance is necessary but not sufficient for meaningful significance. Note
that the described study was conducted to investigate the variation of quan-
tities of cocaine on banknotes across England and Wales. The results would
then assist with the definition of the relevant population in order to assist
with the calculation of the likelihood ratio to evaluate evidence in support
of the prosecution or defence propositions in a particular case. The analysis
of the results of the study does not involve likelihood ratios. The analysis
is an investigation to determine the best-fitting model for the description of
the underlying process that generates the results.
A resolution to the problem of how the difference between meaningful and
statistical significance be described is provided by Weinbach (1989). First, it
should be explained that statistical significance should not be confused with
importance or meaningful support. Second, only practitioners and decision-
makers, not statisticians, can make the final decision as to whether an asso-
ciation and its strength are meaningful. Interpretation of results needs input
from a practitioner as well as a statistician. Thus in a criminal trial it is not
the statistician that should testify to the lack of meaningful support but the
practitioner. Alternatively, the difference can be presented in the report and
the judge or jury can make the decision.
In many cases, the magnitude of the relationship can be reported rather
then the significance probability. Perhaps the magnitude that would be
meaningful can be decided before any data analysis is conducted. The statis-
tician would then have a well-defined cut-off point. However, this approach
is similar to the effect associated with significance testing known as the ‘fall-
off-the cliff’ effect (Robertson et al., 2016). If the difference is just one side of
the point, meaningful support is declared; if the difference is just the other
side of the cut-off point, no meaningful support is declared. The possible
existence of a cut-off point is not the only problem that may arise with an
attempt to determine a numerical solution to the determination of the level of
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support that might be meaningful. A meaningful response is one that would
be a difference in quantity, with perhaps an unusual pattern of contamina-
tion, sufficient to change the opinion of the analysts about how they would
report the findings from a sample of notes. One objective of an analysis of
quantitative measurements might be to provide a measure of support for one
proposition over another using the likelihood ratio. In order for the difference
to be meaningful the difference has to have a substantial impact on the value
of the likelihood ratio (where substantial means a large enough impact to
change the view of the judge or jury). A test as to whether a difference has
a substantial impact would be to alter the measurements in the background
database by that difference and observe the change in the likelihood ratio
(or use alternative databases if these are available and note the changes in
the likelihood ratio). Further discussion of the role of unusual patterns of
responses in the decision as to whether a response is meaningful or not is
beyond the scope of this paper. The purpose of this paper is consideration of
the interpretation for the courts of a result which is statistically significant
but not meaningful.
There are more general comments that are relevant to the role of statistics
and probabilistic reasoning in the administration of criminal justice, exem-
plified by the difficulty described here of explaining the distinction between
meaningful support and statistical significance, again based on ideas in Wein-
bach (1989). Professional judgement is essential to decision-making. A de-
cision should not be delegated to the value of a significance probability or a
meaningful response defined in advance of a study. However, care has to be
taken that the absence of delegation is balanced against the requirement to
be fair and balanced when assessing the results of a study. For example, if
it had been defined in advance of a study what it meant for a result to be
meaningful, it would not be right for an analyst to change their mind about
what is meaningful having seen the results. The contribution of a statistician
to the administration of criminal justice will have most impact when there is
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a practical mix of statistical expertise, the expertise of the forensic scientist
with whom the statistician is working, legal expertise and sound judgement.
In the legal environment, when there is a need for an expert witness who
applies their research to the case in hand, the expert witness, forensic scien-
tist or statistician, should be sensitive to the decision-making needs of the
lawyers, conduct their work for the case and communicate their findings in a
way that can be used by practitioners. Practitioners in many criminal cases
will need to interpret their results for jurors. By the nature of the selection
process, these jurors will have a wide range of backgrounds. Communication
needs to be sensitive to this range.
1.4 Conclusion
There is a problem with presentation of evidence in the courts over the dif-
ference between meaningful significance and statistical significance. For tests
with large power it is possible for a test result to be statistically significant
at a very low level and yet have no meaningful significance. The solution
to the problem is, first, to explain that statistical significance should not be
confused with importance or meaningful support. Second, only practition-
ers, not statisticians, can make the final decision as to whether an association
and its strength are meaningful. Interpretation of results needs input from
a practitioner as well as a statistician. Thus in a criminal trial it is not
the statistician that should testify to the lack of meaningful support but the
practitioner. Expert witness reports which discuss such differences should
be submitted with dual authorship, that of the statistician and that of the
practitioner. As always, a longer term solution is to include appropriate sta-
tistical training in the curricula of law schools and in courses in continuing
professional development.
Education is crucial. Statisticians need to be educated in the ways of
criminal law. Lawyers need to be educated in the ways of statistics and also
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probabilistic reasoning, especially in an understanding of natural variation.
Both lawyers and statisticians are concerned with decision-making under
uncertainty. There is a good case to be put that all law schools should include
a course in statistics in their curriculum. Conversely, it is not clear that all
statistics degree programmes should have a law course in their curriculum.
Statisticians who recognise sufficiently early in their career that they have
an interest in the law should be encouraged to attend law courses.
The International Conference on Forensic Inference and Statistics has
an important role to sustain communication amongst statisticians, forensic
scientists and lawyers so as to ensure the highest quality of administration of
justice as possible. It is a pleasure to note that on the occasion of the tenth
conference that the conference is in a very healthy state and well-placed to
fulfil this role.
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